摘要：

Abstract:

This paper takes the network public opinion in public projects as the research object. Considering the influence of the irra⁃

tional and emotional factors of the participants on their decision-making behavior and based on the evolutionary game model of the

government and interested netizens, this paper innovatively introduces the emotional function combined with the rank-dependented

utility theory, to construct the RDEU evolutionary game model of the network public opinion in public projects, and simulates the influ⁃

ence of different emotions on the evolution state of the netizens through simulation analysis, and verifies the validity of the model. The

article gives the definition of network public opinion in public projects. Under the premise of fully considering the direct correlation

with the interests of netizens, the conclusion is drawn: the game can reach a certain steady state when at least one party maintains ratio⁃

nality; Relieving sensation has a positive effect, and pessimism will make it worse, but the more pessimistic the netizens, the more ef⁃

fective the government's treatment measures; revealing the public psychology of “the more protests, the more you get” in public opin⁃

ion in public projects. Based on the above research results, the final article puts forward corresponding policy recommendations for the

purpose of improving the government's ability to correctly guide public sentiment and solve public projects network grievances.