Abstract: 【Purpose/significance】This study investigated the behavioral strategies of different entities in the process of network rights?protection and their influence on the dissemination of derived public opinion, and provided several management suggestions for net?
work rights-protection. 【Method/process】This study divided the process of network rights-protection into the stage of rights?protection game and the stage of derived public opinion dissemination. We discussed the behavioral strategies between vulnerable
groups, powerful groups and network media by using evolutionary game, and explored the influence of different evolutionary stability
strategies (ESS) on the dissemination of derived public opinion based on the SEIR model. At last, the numerical simulation is con?
ducted to verify the model analysis by using Matlab【. Result/conclusion】The results show that the perceived benefits of positive reports of network media have a significant impact on the dissemination of public opinion. If network media choose "passively report" and pow? erful groups choose "actively response", the public opinion can be easily controlled. If network media choose "actively report" and powerful groups choose to "passively escape", public opinion may be out of control. Moreover, the higher the perceived benefits of so? cial identity of powerful groups, the more likely they choose "actively response", which is beneficial to the control of the derived public opinion. Additionally, the higher the forgetting rate, the shorter the public opinion dissemination time.【Innovation/limitation】By using the evolutionary game and SEIR model, the influence of behavioral strategies on public opinion dissemination is discussed in depth, which can provide valuable suggestions for the handling and responding of network rights-protection