【Purpose/significance】Scientific and technological information plays an important role in promoting scientific and techno⁃

logical development and building a scientific and technological power. Studying the interaction process between scientific and techno⁃logical information institutions and users and understanding its evolution law can provide a theoretical basis for promoting the benign development of scientific and technological information in the future.【Method/process】Based on the game theory, this paper con⁃structs the evolutionary game model of scientific and technological information interaction under the government incentives, with scien⁃tific and technological information institutions and users as the main body of the evolutionary game. The evolutionary income matrix and replication dynamic equation of the model are obtained by calculation, the local stability of the model is analyzed, and the simula⁃tion is carried out to verify the correctness of the theoretical analysis.【Result/conclusion】 The results show that the cost of users' par⁃ticipation in scientific and technological information interaction and the additional cost paid by institutional optimization have a nega⁃tive effect on scientific and technological information interaction, while the benefits obtained by users and the losses borne by institu⁃tions without optimization can promote, and the government incentive has a positive effect on institutions' selection of optimization strategies. Finally, it puts forward scientific suggestions from three aspects: scientific and technological information institutions, scien⁃tific and technological information users and government incentives.【Innovation/limitation】This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of science and technology information interaction from the perspective of government incentives, but science and technol⁃ogy information interaction is a complex process, and more factors need to be considered in future research.