Abstract: 【Purpose/significance】Under the background of new media,multi-agent joint refuting creates a new mode of refuting ru⁃mors.The study of the strategic choice dependence of different subjects under information sharing provides a theoretical basis for the joint subjects to make scientific decisions【. Method/process】Considering the influence of external random factors and the dependence of strategy selection among different information subjects,we established a stochastic differential game model in the two situations of Stackelberg master-slave cooperation and cooperative cooperation.Through numerical simulations,we present the optimal equilibrium analysis of the two modes【. Result/conclusion】The results show that the generation of rumor-refuting information is related to the cost
of information sharing,marginal benefits of information sharing,impact of rumor-refuting information and attenuation rate of informa⁃ tion.There are four indicators under the cooperative game,including the information sharing volume,the income of the system,the expec⁃tation and variance of the generation of rumor-refuting information,which are higher than the Stackelberg master-slave game【. Innova⁃tion/limitation】The research provides theoretical support for the subjects of rumor-refuting to take corresponding measures to deal with online rumors in a timely manner.Moreover,the relevant conclusions can provide methodological support for the governance of on⁃line rumors and early warning of public opinions.